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 ABSTRACT 
 The purpose of this thesis is to examine why so many uses of the word literal 
(whether taken from everyday contemporary speech or the works of well-respected 
ancient writers) seem at odds with the word’s theoretical definition and to explore the 
implications of this disparity for those who privilege a literal interpretation of Scripture. 
The examples will show that the meaning of literal was not altered at a particular point in 
time, nor is it altered on an ongoing basis by a small subset of particularly idiosyncratic 
individuals. Rather, the word is predisposed to behave strangely the moment it is used 
outside the context of meta-discussions about language itself. This is because a common 
assumption underlying most theories of literal meaning is that minimally competent 
interlocutors understand such meaning tacitly. Yet when we explicitly describe a given 
interpretation as literal (and then go on to explain what that interpretation is), this 
suggests it was not already tacit to begin with. Since a key component of why literal 
meaning is often privileged (and sometimes disparaged) is that it is thought to correspond 
to what minimally competent interlocutors understand tacitly, this means the actual 
interpretations one ends up privileging or disparaging tend to be divorced from one’s 
supposed reasons for doing so. The result is that the pursuit of literal interpretation 
(whether of Scripture or any other text) tends to lead away from the very thing that one 
claims to seek. 
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  Why do other people use the word literal so strangely? Many have asked this 
question in exasperation at one time or another, whether upon hearing an acquaintance 
utter, “It was so funny I literally laughed my head off,” or encountering an ancient writer 
who teaches that Christ “is literally the Light but metaphorically a stone.”1 In my 
research, I have come across too many bizarre uses of literal to discount them as 
anomalous and have found that the closer I look at seemingly regular uses of the word, 
the stranger they reveal themselves to be. What is strange, I have decided, is that we use 
this word at all outside the context of meta-discussions about language itself. A 
prevailing theme within these meta-discussions is that literal meaning is tacit to typical 
language users, and there is usually no need to talk about what is already mutually 
understood. Yet talk about it we do: according to data from the Corpus of Contemporary 
American English (COCA),2 the adverbial form literally is among the 5,000 most 
frequently used words in American English today, and the adjectival form literal sits 
comfortably within the top 10,000.3 It seems we cannot help ourselves from talking about 
what we paradoxically assume goes without saying. In this thesis, I will argue that the 
interpretations we explicitly describe as literal outside meta-discussions about language 
tend to be precisely those that deviate from our own estimation of what is tacit to the 
                                                
 1. Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis 4.28.35 (ACW 41:136). 
 
 2. Mark Davies, “The Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA): 560 million words, 
1990–present,” 2008–, https://corpus.byu.edu/coca/. 
 




minimally competent interlocutors we tend to highlight as exemplars of literal 
interpretation within these meta-discussions.  
 By “interlocutor,” I mean any person who takes part in the communication 
exchange at any point in time: the speaker or author and the original audience, as well as 
any later interpreters. By “minimally competent,” I mean an average, reasonably savvy, 
reasonably knowledgeable, fluent adult native speaker of a given language. This contrasts 
with both “maximally competent” interlocutors who display significantly greater than 
average cunning, expertise, or verbal ability for a given instance of communication and 
“incompetent” interlocutors who fall below whatever threshold is thought to define 
minimal competence for the task at hand. In our meta-discussions about language theory, 
literal meaning is typically portrayed as something that should be obvious to a typical 
minimally competent interlocutor. Yet outside our meta-discussions about language, 
whenever we explicitly indicate that particular interpretations are literal ones, they tend to 
be precisely those that are peripheral and non-obvious—the sort that only occur to 
interlocutors who are either incompetent or maximally competent. In the pages that 
follow, I will use the phrase “tacitly literal interpretation” to refer to meanings that 
represent the mutual unspoken understanding between minimally competent interlocutors 
and “explicitly literal interpretation” to refer to interpretations that have been specifically 
described as literal using the English word literal or literally or any foreign language 
cognate. In other words, tacitly literal interpretation is what we should describe as literal 
based on our meta-discussions about language, while explicitly literal interpretation is 
what we actually end up describing as literal. The reason I use the words “tacitly literal” 




forefront of our minds: we feel strangely compelled to make explicit what we allege is 
already tacit, to say what should theoretically go without saying.  
 Previous attempts to explain supposedly anomalous uses of literal have tended to 
boil down to one of two central claims: either the original meaning was altered at a 
particular point in time, or the more customary meaning is altered at all times by 
particularly idiosyncratic individuals. An example of the former argument is seen when 
lexicographers such as Jesse Sheidlower offer a history of different strains of usage, 
showing that literally was first used as an intensifier for true statements in the late 17th 
century, was eventually used to emphasize both factually accurate statements and those 
that employ more poetic license, and is today used both as an intensive and as a term to 
distinguish between literal and non-literal meanings.4 The latter argument is often seen in 
the work of scholars engaged in a focused analysis of a particular writer. For example, 
shortly before exploring what Augustine of Hippo might mean by his perplexing claim 
that “Christ is literally the Light but metaphorically a stone,”5 K. E. Greene-McCreight 
warns her readers to “put aside any preconceived notions of what the terms ‘literal’ and 
‘allegorical’ might mean, or Augustine may appear to be talking nonsense.”6 The 
implication here is that Greene-McCreight can reasonably assume her potential readers 
will have the same (or at least similar) “preconceived notions” about what the word 
                                                
 4. Jesse Sheidlower, “The Word We Love to Hate: Literally,” Slate, 1 Nov 2005, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/the_good_word/2005/11/the_word_we_love_to_hate.html. 
 
 5. Kathryn E. Greene-McCreight, Ad Litteram: How Augustine, Calvin, and Barth, Read the 
“Plain Sense” of Genesis 1–3, Issues in Systematic Theology 5 (New York: Lang, 1999), 45. She posits 
that “there are (at least) two possible assumptions at play here. He may be saying that Christ is literally the 
Light because He names Himself thus but is metaphorically a stone because this prophecy is applied to Him 
by others. Or, Augustine may possibly be saying that Christ is literally Light since the second person of the 
Trinity, the Word, is active in creation (‘And God said, “Let there be light.”’), but Christ is metaphorically 
a stone since ‘stone’ is less of a controlling metaphor for the identity of the second person of the Trinity in 
the catholic faith.” 
 




literal means and will perceive Augustine’s statements as idiosyncratic departures from 
this more generally agreed-upon customary meaning. In her analysis, Greene-McCreight 
makes a distinction between what she calls “hermeneutical theory” and “exegesis itself”:  
In order to gain a clearer understanding of what Augustine means by the “literal,” 
“proper,” or “historical” sense, we must turn to his exegesis itself. Apart from De 
Doctrina Christiana, if one were interested in his hermeneutical theory one would 
look for example at On the Spirit and the Letter, which was written in 412 during 
the same period of writing as De Genesi ad litteram. But our interest is in seeking 
hermeneutical assumptions as they become evident “at work” in interpretation 
itself. Therefore, we will need to look at instances of actual exegesis, where the 
rubber meets the road, so to speak.7 
 
As befits a scholar engaged in a charitable close reading of ancient texts, Greene-
McCreight assumes that Augustine’s instances of actual exegesis will further illuminate, 
rather than undermine, his hermeneutical theory. However, I have come to expect quite 
the opposite: a speaker’s instances of actual literal exegesis (“where the rubber meets the 
road”) tend to contradict not just the audience’s preconceived notions about what literal 
meaning is supposed to entail, but also the speaker’s as well. This is not a criticism 
against Augustine or any individual in particular; it is a general tendency that manifests 
again and again wherever the word literal is used to describe specific examples of 
interpretation. The propensity for claiming one thing about literal meaning during meta-
discussions about language and suggesting quite another when discussing actual instances 
of literal interpretation is not limited to only the most rationally deficient segments of 
contemporary society or to the most brilliant yet idiosyncratic interpreters of yore, but is 
instead the most likely outcome whenever we hazard to make explicit meanings that we 
allege to be already tacit. The meaning of literal was not corrupted at a particular point in 
history, but was always predisposed to behave strangely the moment we decided to use it 
                                                




outside the context of meta-discussions about language. I believe it is true what we say in 
these meta-discussions: that there exists a meaning tacit to minimally competent 
interlocutors. However, assuming one is addressing a minimally competent interlocutor, 
meanings that are truly tacit should not need to be made explicit. Thus, I am initially 
suspicious whenever someone claims that a particular interpretation of interest to them is 
also the one that should already be tacit to me.  
 In other contexts, we are more accustomed to a healthy dose of skepticism in this 
regard. For example, we are rightly suspicious when a talking head on the television 
reports that “everyone knows” a certain political candidate is going to win an election if 
we know the talking head strongly supports that candidate’s platform. We might think to 
ourselves that the candidate’s success might not be so inevitable as this spokesperson 
would have us believe. Rather, they might be trying to convince fair-weather supporters 
of the candidate to participate in making history while simultaneously suggesting to 
potential naysayers that voting against the candidate is a waste of time, so you might as 
well just stay home on Election Day. Similarly, it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to tell 
the jury “everyone knows” the defendant is guilty. Hearsay among members of the 
general populace unfamiliar with evidence presented in court is irrelevant to the case, and 
the courts work hard to insulate proceedings from the media and instruct jurors not to 
discuss the case with anyone else until a decision has been reached.  
 My hope is that the reader will come to apply this same level of initial skepticism 
to anyone who refers to a literal interpretation and then goes on to explain what that 
interpretation is. If someone claims that a certain passage of the Bible should be 




smile, confident that there exists a shared, tacit understanding of the passage’s plain 
meaning, then perhaps the literal meaning is indeed clearly obvious. If, however, one 
feels compelled to also expound the passage’s literal meaning, this suggests the 
interpretation may not be quite so plain as one wants it to be. Similarly, if someone says, 
“My kid took me literally when I said to count higher,” and is then content to pause and 
wait for a laugh, confident that the humorous incident has been effectively conveyed, this 
is good evidence that the child’s interpretation jibes with the plain meaning of that 
command. But if one feels compelled to go on and explain, “She jumped on the couch, 
reached up her hands, and counted to ten again!”8 then this suggests that the child’s 
(mis)interpretation does not line up with the meaning plain to a typical adult language 
user. Indeed, the incident is humorous and noteworthy precisely because it deviates from 
the expectations of those telling and listening to the story. This is my central point: our 
meta-discussions about language theory tend to insist upon a link between plain meaning 
and literal meaning, but the specific interpretations we actually describe as literal tend to 
be precisely those that deviate from our own estimations of plain meaning.  
 This matters because the word literal is only rarely used as a neutral term to 
distinguish between equally legitimate interpretations. Rather, the invocation of this 
powerful word either privileges or disparages the interpretation it identifies. In English, 
the most common use of the word literally is as a generic intensifier: I literally laughed 
my head off, I’m literally starving, I’m literally head over heels in love, etc. As with other 
intensifiers such as actually, really, truly, and totally, the addition of literally is meant to 
emphasize that what one is saying is true. So truth is connected with literalness in our 
                                                




language, and in many other languages that also use cognates of literally as intensifiers.9 
In the United States, many continue to hold the Bible and specifically the literal meaning 
of the Bible sacred: a 2017 Gallup poll shows that nearly one in four Americans (24%) 
still prefer the statement, “The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, 
word for word,” over the option that it is “the inspired word of God, but not everything in 
it should be taken literally,” (47%) or “an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and 
moral precepts recorded by man” (26%).10 George Lakoff put it best in his essay, “The 
Meanings of Literal”:  
The sacred status of literal meaning is no secret. The literal is typically viewed as 
the main concern of the study of semantics; all else is taken as secondary and 
peripheral. It is the literal that is assumed to give us our fundamental grip on 
meaningfulness, on factuality, on straight talk, and on reason. The nonliteral is 
seen from this perspective as dispensable—a matter of indirectness, exaggeration, 
embellishment, interpretation, metaphor. The literal, in the classical story, is the 
indispensible [sic] sacred rock that forms the bulk of our language and thought.11 
 
 Historically, however, we are almost as likely to disparage literal meaning as to 
privilege it. Taking cues from the apostle Paul’s assessment that “the letter kills, but the 
                                                
 9. Examples of the intensive usage in other languages are not difficult to find. A Dumas novel 
serialized from 1844–5 has a speaker exaggerating his account of war-torn Nimes by claiming he “literally 
[littéralement in the original French] waded in blood.” Alexandre Dumas, The Count of Monte Cristo, 
Modern Library Paperback Edition (New York: Random House, 2002), 582. Meanwhile, an 1880 novel by 
Dostoyevsky has one character leveling the following accusation against another: “You literally 
[буквально in the original Russian] soil everything you come into contact with.” Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The 
Brothers Karamazov, trans. David McDuff, rev. ed. (London: Penguin, 2003), 64. There is some collective 
denial regarding this fact. English translations of works that use foreign language cognates of literally 
intensively sometimes omit the word, perhaps under the assumption that such usage represents improper 
English, even if it is proper in Russian or French. On the other side of the coin, I have asked friends who 
speak Russian and French if the equivalent of literally in those languages is ever used intensively, and have 
been assured that the phenomenon is confined to English alone. 
 
 10. Lydia Saad, “Record Few Americans Believe Bible Is Literal Word of God,” Gallup, 15 May 
2017, http://news.gallup.com/poll/210704/record-few-americans-believe-bible-literal-word-god.aspx. 
Gallup has been offering these same three answer choices to respondents since they began asking the 
question in 1976. While the number of Americans who privilege literal interpretation is still significant, it is 
steadily declining. As Saad notes in her report, the 2017 survey marked “the first time in Gallup's four-
decade trend that biblical literalism has not surpassed biblical skepticism.”  
 




Spirit gives life” (2 Cor 3:6), many Christians throughout history have prioritized 
“spiritual” interpretations over literal ones and reserved varying levels of disdain for what 
may be viewed as the necessary and lowest first step on the path toward true 
understanding. Origen had some of the harshest words to say about this necessary first 
step:  
[A]t first glance, the letter is very bitter. It prescribes the circumcision of the 
flesh, it commands sacrifices and the other things that are designated as “the letter 
that kills” (2 Cor 3:6). Throw all this away, as you would the bitter rind of a nut. 
In the second place you will reach the protective covering of the shell in which 
moral teaching or the definition of self-control is described. These are, of course, 
necessary to protect what is contained inside, but doubtless they are to be cracked 




But in the third place you will find hidden and concealed in the [law and the 
prophets] the meaning of the mysteries “of the wisdom and knowledge of God” 
(Col 2:3) by which the souls of the saints are nourished and fed, not only in this 
present life but also in the future. For this is the priestly fruit about which the 
promise is given to those “who hunger and thirst for justice,” that “they shall be 
satisfied” (Matt 5:6).12 
 
According to Origen, literal meaning is “bitter” and should be thrown away. Even the 
moral sense, contained inside the literal, is to be “cracked and removed” to get to the 
hidden mysteries buried deeper within. There is an explicit hierarchy in Origen’s 
threefold system and (at the very least) an implicit hierarchy to the fourfold method of 
interpretation that held sway over Christian hermeneutics in Europe throughout the 
Middle Ages, where the literal sense was either viewed as the lowest rung or outermost 
layer one must traverse before attaining the worthier typological, moral, and anagogical 
understandings. Outside Christian hermeneutics, we see literal meaning disparaged in 
contemporary secular speech as children, non-native speakers, and people on the autism 
                                                




spectrum are mocked for their so-called literal-mindedness. In the same vein, literal or 
“word-for-word” translations of foreign language texts are often derided as stilted and 
awkward, while dynamic equivalency or “thought-for-thought” translations are praised.  
 These two traditions, privileging and disparaging, exist in tandem—the only 
unusual opinion about literal interpretation seems to be a neutral one. But whether we 
privilege or disparage literal interpretation, we tend to do so for the same reason—
namely, because we presume literal understanding is tacitly understood by minimally 
competent interlocutors. For those who privilege literal meaning, this might be couched 
in positive terms such as straightforward, plain, and clear, and literal meaning is viewed 
as the universal language most suitable for effective communication. Meanwhile, those 
who disparage it might couch it in negative terms such as superficial, trivial, and puerile, 
and literal meaning is viewed as the lowest common denominator that should be 
transcended by those with the cognitive ability to do so. But if I am correct and the 
interpretations we explicitly describe as literal tend to diverge from even our own 
estimations about the meanings tacit to minimally competent interlocutors, then the actual 
interpretations we privilege or disparage are divorced from our supposed reasons for 
doing so.  
 To discover if a particular instance of explicitly literal interpretation is divorced 
from a given interlocutor’s supposed reasons for privileging or disparaging it, I will use 
the following three-part litmus test:  
1. Does the use of literal in a given instance of explicitly literal interpretation 
either privilege or disparage the meaning it identifies, or is it merely used as a 
neutral term in order to make a helpful distinction? 
 
2. If the designated literal meaning is either privileged or disparaged, is this 





3. Is this meaning in fact tacit to minimally competent interlocutors? 
 
 Chapter 1 is divided into three sections that correspond to the three questions in 
this litmus test. In the first section, Ferdinand de Saussure’s theory about the arbitrary 
nature of the sign and the negative nature of meaning-making in language will help us 
recognize the only circumstance in which a use of literal can be truly neutral: mere 
distinction. In the second section, we will look at various recurring themes in meta-
discussions about language to show that literal meaning is typically portrayed as that 
which is tacit to minimally competent interlocutors. In the third and final section, we 
bring everything together and apply all three questions in our litmus test to two texts that 
privilege literal interpretation: The Chicago Statement on Biblical Hermeneutics and 
Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica. In order to show that the phenomenon of 
describing non-tacit meanings as literal is not confined only to those who privilege the 
literal interpretation of Scripture, Chapter 2 will examine various additional examples in 
contemporary usage. Our final example, however, is a strange use of literal from the 
same document that provides the word’s earliest attestation in English: John Purvey’s 
prologue to the Wycliffe Bible. Taken together, this evidence will lead us to conclude 
that describing as literal meanings which deviate from the tacit understanding of 





TACITLY LITERAL INTERPRETATION AND MINIMALLY COMPETENT 
INTERLOCUTORS
 The purpose of this chapter is to lay a foundation that will help us answer the first 
two questions in our three-part litmus test so that we can apply all three questions to two 
instances where the literal meaning of the Bible is privileged: The Chicago Statement on 
Biblical Hermeneutics and Thomas Aquinas’s discussion of literal meaning in his Summa 
Theologica. The first two sections correspond to the first two questions of our litmus test.  
“Neutral” Defined as Arbitrary Differentiation 
 I had Saussure in mind as I crafted the first question of my three-part test, in 
which I equate a neutral use of literal with one that merely makes a helpful distinction: 
1. Does the use of literal in a given instance of explicitly literal interpretation 
either privilege or disparage the meaning it identifies, or is it merely used as a 
neutral term in order to make a helpful distinction? 
 
Wrapped up in this are two components of Saussure’s theory of signs: (1) the signs used 
in language are arbitrary, and (2) the value of signs is purely negative and differential, 
rather than positive.  
 By “arbitrary,” Saussure means that the signs used to describe concepts in a given 
language could be otherwise; there is no intrinsic quality linking a sign with its meaning. 
He offers the following example in his Course in General Linguistics: “The idea of 
‘sister’ is not linked by any inner relationship to the succession of sounds s-ö-r which 




sequence is proved by differences among languages and by the very existence of different 
languages.”1 Even with onomatopoeia and interjections (two categories of words that 
seem to have a natural connection with what they signify) Saussure shows that the words 
solidified by convention are arbitrary: in English, a dog says bow-wow and a person in 
pain shouts ouch!, but in French, a dog says ouaoua, and a person screams aie!2  
 By “negative” and “differential,” Saussure emphasizes that the meaning of words 
comes from their distinction from and opposition to one another rather than any inherent 
value. He offers an example of a non-linguistic sign to illustrate the point: “A coin 
nominally worth five francs may contain less than half its worth of silver. Its value will 
vary according to the amount stamped upon it and according to its use inside or outside a 
political boundary.”3 The same concept can be seen with the various fonts and styles of 
handwriting in a given language: “The value of letters is purely negative and differential. 
The same person can write t, for instance, in different ways […] The only requirement is 
that the sign for t not be confused in his script with the signs used for l, d, etc.”4  
 Saussure cautions that the word arbitrary “should not imply that the choice of the 
signifier is left entirely to the speaker […] the individual does not have the power to 
change a sign in any way once it has become established in the linguistic community.” 
But this warning is tempered somewhat by his example of handwriting. While it is true 
that the linguistic community will not accept handwriting that makes a w look like a Q 
                                                
 1. Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, eds. Charles Bally, Albert Sechehaye, 
and Albert Riedlinger, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959; repr., New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1966), 67–8. 
 
 2. Ibid., 69. 
 
 3. Ibid., 118. 
 




(unless it is known that one is using a cipher), there is quite a bit of latitude for similarity 
between certain letters and numbers in a given typeface or written script: l, and I, o and e, 
x and t, v and u, O and 0, 2 and Z, 5 and S, etc. Similarly, with pronunciation, there is 
sometimes latitude and sometimes not. As Saussure reflects:  
Every language probably contains certain elements or groups which, for some 
reason, display pronunciation tolerance, while the pronunciation of the great 
majority remains quite inflexible. The French r sound may be pronounced using 
two or three consonants whose articulation is totally different. Indeed, such is the 
difference to the ear that they are the first thing one notices in an individual’s way 
of speaking. However, all these highly divergent sounds are accepted—are 
‘legal’—with the same value. Yet the most insignificant deviation in the 
pronunciation of an s or a d would immediately appear as a ridiculous 
shortcoming in pronunciation or as the sign of a foreign accent, a direct and 
irreconcilable affront to our feeling for the language.5  
 
 Similar to this pronunciation tolerance for variations of the French r, I have found 
that there is a great degree of “interpretation tolerance” when it comes to words such as 
literal that we use to describe meaning itself. The same interpretation may sometimes be 
variously described as literal, figurative, technical, metaphorical, physical, spiritual, 
actual, etc. without necessarily facing backlash from the linguistic community. The 
important thing is to make distinctions between various interpretations that other 
interlocutors can easily grasp; the words used to make these distinctions are of secondary 
importance. Thus there is a surprisingly high tolerance even for describing as literal an 
interpretation that another interlocutor might describe as figurative. This tolerance is 
higher than for other adjectives. Although one might agree to disagree with a friend 
regarding whether a certain swath of paint is green or blue, one could never come to 
terms with someone who insists that a yellow object is actually purple. Yet when it comes 
                                                
 5. Ferdinand de Saussure, Writings in General Linguistics, eds. Simon Bouquet, Rudolf Engler, 
and Antoinette Weil, trans. Carol Sanders, Matthew Pires, and Peter Figueroa (Oxford: Oxford University 




to the word literal, we are surprisingly tolerant not only with those who use it to describe 
a meaning that we might rather call “physical,” “historical,” or “technical” but even 
“figurative,” “allegorical,” or “metaphorical.” The difference, I think, is that we use these 
words to describe meaning itself and especially ambiguous meanings or polysemous 
texts: the act of differentiating between meanings entails the existence of various 
meanings. Thus we tend to utilize these words only when we are already venturing into 
uncharted territory, so their arbitrary and differential nature is more palpable than in other 
terms more cemented by convention. For the vast majority of potential utterances, there is 
no convention that predetermines barriers for literal and other kinds of meaning.  
 I will illustrate with a conversation that took place between my wife and me as we 
were driving parallel to the outer fence of a gated community. Wondering to myself if we 
would ever be wealthy enough to purchase a house in such an upscale neighborhood, I 
asked, “Do you think we’ll ever live ‘beyond the wall?” As I said, “beyond the wall,” I 
moved my palm in a circle on an invisible plane parallel to the fence we were driving 
beside to indicate which wall I was referring to. Unfortunately, since she was sitting 
between my palm and this fence (which lay outside her window), I inadvertently mimed 
an invisible barrier between our seats with this gesture. I was surprised by the expression 
of hurt she gave me, and after better explaining what I meant, she sighed with relief and 
said, “I thought you were talking literally about a wall between us in our relationship.” 
There is no predetermined “literal” meaning of my idiosyncratic statement-gesture 
solidified by convention. Upon reflection, neither her interpretation nor my intended 
meaning seems to fit the bill of “literal” in any strict sense. Although I had hoped my 




asking if we might live in that particular neighborhood at some point in the future but 
rather if we might live in any house anywhere at least as nice as the ones we could see 
beyond the fence. And although the invisible wall I had accidentally mimed between us 
made the image of a relationship barrier unusually vivid in her mind, it was still just that: 
a mental image.  
 In using literally, she differentiated another possible interpretation of my 
combined statement-gesture in a non-judgmental way in order to clear up a 
misunderstanding. Her choice of words was arbitrary in a Saussurean sense because she 
could just as easily have said that she thought I was talking figuratively, socially, 
metaphorically, philosophically, etc. and the effect would have been the same: it merely 
prepared me to consider of an alternative meaning of wall. Thus, I would argue that her 
use of literally was neutral in this instance. If, however, it could be shown from context 
or subsequent conversation that there was a slight dig in her choice of words here, so that 
by describing her initial interpretation as literal she meant to imply, “And the way I took 
it is just the way any reasonable person would have taken it, you insensitive dolt!” then it 
would be clear that her use of literally was meant to privilege the interpretation it 
identified because it is what “any reasonable person” would understand tacitly. It would 
then be up to the marriage counselor to answer the third part of our litmus test and 
determine whether her interpretation jibes with the tacit understanding of a minimally 
competent interlocutor subjected to my insensitive and apparently ambiguous gestures.  
 It is not necessary for interlocutors to have a thorough understanding of 
Saussurean sign theory or be aware of the arbitrary and differential nature of their use of 




substitute the word literal or literally for different or differently and see if the same basic 
meaning is conveyed. The substitution itself will test for arbitrariness, and our choice of 
substitute will reveal whether mere differentiation is sufficient for the interlocutor’s 
purposes or whether they are attributing additional value to the designation literal: either 
good or bad. With this test, we must allow for the fact that different and differently are 
less grammatically flexible than literal and literally. In cases where the substitution does 
not make grammatical sense, we should interpret it as a parenthetical instruction, 
“[Consider a different interpretation of the nearby message.]” Barring revelations during 
the counseling session, my wife’s use of literal passes this test. She was essentially 
saying that she thought I was “talking [differently] about a wall between us in our 
relationship.” For explicitly literal interpretations that fail this test, we proceed to the 
second stage of our three-part questionnaire. 
 Before advancing, however, I would be remiss to rely so heavily upon Saussure, 
the father of what came to be known as structuralism, without at least mentioning 
Derrida, the father of deconstruction. Here I will not do justice to the complexity and 
nuance of Derrida’s intentionally misspelled and notoriously indefinable neologism 
différance, but will rehash the oft-repeated observation that his invention plays on the 
French verb différer, which means both “to differ” and “to defer.” At the risk of 
oversimplification, I will say that Derrida’s notion of différance adds to Saussure’s point 
about negative differentiation in language an unrelenting emphasis on how meaning in 
language is always deferred in a never-ending, self-referential loop. The classic 
illustration of this deferral is looking up a word in a dictionary to learn its “meaning” and 




definitions ad nauseum until the various rabbit holes eventually circle back on 
themselves, using only words whose meanings have already been deferred. The third part 
of my litmus test is a deconstructive move in that it holds those who use literal to 
privilege or disparage an interpretation accountable to their supposed reasons for doing 
so, but the test as a whole is quite limited in its capacity for devastation. Interlocutors 
who can be shown to neither privilege nor disparage an interpretation through their use of 
literal will not be destroyed, and I will have no comment on the meaningfulness or 
meaninglessness of language that does not include the term literal. But what I can offer is 
a simple method for taking certain claims about literal meaning to task and a description 
of general tendencies in our collective use of literal that—while they may not preclude 
one from pursuing literal interpretation—nevertheless serves as a warning that this 
pursuit may not lead one where one wants to go, if the predictable unspoken 
understanding of minimally competent interlocutors is what one seeks. 
Literal Meaning as That Which Is Tacit to Minimally Competent Interlocutors 
 If we determine that the use of literal in a given instance of explicitly literal 
interpretation does more than simply create a helpful distinction according to the criteria 
outlined above, we advance to the second part of our litmus test:  
2. If the designated literal meaning is either privileged or disparaged, is this 
because it is thought to be tacit to minimally competent interlocutors? 
 
The word tacit is not one you are likely to find in formal definitions of literal, yet if our 
quintessential claims about the nature of literal meaning are true, then the tacitness of 
literal meaning is a necessary corollary. Many of the positive terms we associate with 
literal meaning (simple, plain, ordinary, normal, straightforward, obvious, etc.) carry 




interlocutors. The more disparaging words we associate with literal meaning (superficial, 
trivial, puerile, etc.) carry with them the notion that these incorrect or incomplete 
interpretations are tacit to both incompetent and minimally competent interlocutors 
alike—but whereas incompetent interlocutors are stuck with their incomplete or 
erroneous initial impressions, minimally competent interlocutors are able to perceive and 
then transcend them. According to some theories of language comprehension, this ability 
to transcend one’s initial tacit understanding is part of what makes a minimally 
competent interlocutor minimally competent. 
 One such theory of language is seen in the standard pragmatic model of metaphor 
comprehension, in which language users seek literal meaning by default, and enquire no 
further when literal meaning makes sense in context. Only when literal interpretation 
renders incomprehensible or absurd meanings do language users begin searching for 
alternative figurative interpretations. A corollary assumption to this model is that literal 
interpretation is automatic and involuntary for minimally competent interlocutors, while 
figurative interpretation is optional and requires additional processing time—quite 
possibly even additional knowledge or skill to be understood correctly. John Searle’s 
formulation is often cited6 as representative of this view: “Where the utterance is 
defective if taken literally, look for an utterance meaning that differs from sentence 
meaning.”7 
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 Although the standard pragmatic model and its resulting assumptions still hold 
sway over many of our folk theories of language today, it has been losing favor among 
scholars who study the psychology of linguistics in recent decades. Sam Glucksberg and 
his colleagues dispute the model for several reasons. First, studies have not demonstrated 
any additional processing time required to understand figurative as opposed to literal 
meanings. Under comparable conditions, apt metaphors are understood just as quickly as 
sensible literal statements.8 Second, Glucksberg argues, fluent speakers process them just 
as automatically and involuntarily: “We can no more shut off our metaphor-
understanding machinery than our literal-understanding machinery.”9 Third, the standard 
pragmatic model does not explain how we interpret statements such as “No man is an 
island” that are literally true but uninteresting when interpreted literally.10 Yet while 
Glucksberg critiques the standard pragmatic model, both he and the more traditional 
model affirm that minimally competent interlocutors understand literal meaning tacitly, 
even without using those particular terms. What Glucksberg emphasizes, however, is that 
metaphor comprehension is equally tacit, or (to use his words) “automatic.”  
 Glucksberg stresses that his use of the term automatic “does not mean that literal 
understanding is not effortful or does not require complex computation.”11 Glucksberg is 
particularly insistent that any defensible theory of literal interpretation must go beyond 
the “minimalist literal” of word-for-word decoding: 
An example from a recent New York Times headline makes clear the need to go 
beyond bare-bones literal meanings: Price Soars for Eggs, Setting Off a Debate 
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on a Clinic’s Ethics. The linguistic literal meaning is not at issue here. Each of the 
words and phrases in the heading is intended in its primary, literal sense. Eggs 
refers to eggs (but what kind?); prices refers to the cost of something (but at what 
level?); clinic refers to the medical sense of clinic (but what kind?); ethics refers 
to what people ordinarily think of as ethics and morals. It is not until one reads 
further that one learns that the eggs that are referred to are not the sort that one 
scrambles for breakfast but instead are human ova that, if fertilized and implanted 
in a womb, develop into human babies. The clinic is a fertility clinic, and the issue 
is whether or not young women should sell or “donate” their ova for artificial 
insemination and implantation in donee mothers. The egg providers can be 
viewed as “donors” if they receive some small remuneration for their time and 
trouble; they would be viewed as sellers if they were to receive a lot of money. 
The ethical issue is whether or not human ova should be sold for profit. The 
deceptively simple, literally intended headline turns out to require a wealth of 
biological, medical, social, cultural, theological, economic, and sociological 
knowledge to be understood as intended.12 
 
 Although Glucksberg argues that a wealth of complex linguistic and nonlinguistic 
knowledge is required to correctly interpret this deceptively simple headline, he is 
adamant that “fluent speakers of a language do not have the option of refusing to 
understand.”13 More importantly, this understanding comes quickly, naturally, and 
automatically because “contextually appropriate meaning is selectively accessed 
whenever the context makes absolutely clear which meaning of an ambiguous word is 
intended.”14 Glucksberg maintains that this is true whether one intends something 
literally or metaphorically. Thus, literal interpretation is more complex (in terms of 
required knowledge and context) and metaphor interpretation simpler (in terms of 
required processing time) than the standard pragmatic model would have us believe. 
Given sufficient context, minimally competent interlocutors understand both metaphors 
and literal statements tacitly.  
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 We have just looked at two traditional claims about literal meaning along with 
Glucksberg’s critique of them: (1) we interpret literally by default, only seeking 
figurative meaning when literal meaning is absurd, and (2) literal meaning can be 
paraphrased as “word-for-word” meaning; it stands on its own rather than being context 
dependent. Glucksberg disputes both claims, but in both cases, the tacitness of literal 
meaning is affirmed whether one follows the standard pragmatic model of metaphor 
comprehension or accepts Gluksberg’s critique of that model. In the traditional view, ease 
of interpretation is one of the things that distinguishes literal meaning from metaphor, 
while according to Glucksberg, apt metaphors and literal meaning are equally tacit (or, to 
use his terms, automatic and involuntary), and context is required to correctly interpret 
either type.  
 The tensions between traditional and contemporary theories of literal 
interpretation can be seen in the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) entry for just one of 
the many senses of literal it records.15 There are three main parts to this particular 
definition. The first part, “designating the primary, original, or etymological sense of a 
word…” suggests a traditional word-for-word, context-independent theory of literal 
interpretation. The term “primary” suggests interpreting individual words in the way 
typical, minimally competent interlocutors would: according to their most common or 
basic meaning. The terms “original” and “etymological” suggest interpreting words as 
minimally competent interlocutors did when these words were first introduced into 
English. The second part of the definition, “…or the exact sense expressed by the actual 
wording of a phrase or passage…” would appeal to Glucksberg since it takes the 
surrounding context into account. This reminds us that literal interpretation sometimes 
                                                




moves beyond the minimalist literal of word-for-word decoding but is still grounded in 
the “exact” and “actual” meaning that should be tacit to minimally competent 
interlocutors. The third part, “…as distinguished from any extended sense, metaphorical 
meaning, or underlying significance” introduces some exclusionary criteria: literal 
meaning is that which is derived after considering some necessary amount of context, but 
perhaps not if that context suggests an interpretation that is considered antithetical to 
literal meaning. How do we know, at a glance, what is antithetical to literal meaning? The 
notion of tacitness is a common thread that weaves the disparate concepts of “underlying 
significance,” “extended sense,” and “metaphorical meaning” together. Tacit 
understandings are plain for all to see, unlike those that lie underneath the “surface” of 
the text. Tacit understandings are apparent from the beginning, unlike those that extend 
beyond initial impressions. And finally (if one subscribes to the standard pragmatic 
model), tacitly literal understandings are the first that an interpreter will consider, while 
metaphorical meanings will come later, if at all. Because metaphor, underlying 
significance, and extended meaning are considered anathema to tacit understanding (for 
those who do not share Glucksberg’s views), an interpretation that includes them may be 
judged non-literal even if it is the most contextually appropriate and readily understood 
interpretation.  
 If we were to read this entry from the OED through the lens of deconstruction, 
Derrida would want us to recognize that the prevalence of “or” is astonishing. If literal 
meaning defers to the “primary” or “original” or “etymological” sense of individual 
words or the wording of a phrase or passage, it would seem we might have leeway to 




meanings, Derrida would point out that different dictionaries list different senses as the 
first definition under a given headword and that some words have dozens or (in the case 
of set) well over a hundred distinct senses that vie for the position. And even if we could 
maintain a constantly updated electronic dictionary that objectively determined the most 
common “primary” meaning of words in contemporary usage through relentless data 
collection and analysis, would we be willing to defer literal meaning to changes in usage 
as different senses of words are born and rise to prominence? When it comes to the 
“original” meaning of a word, will we defer literal meaning to new discoveries of old 
manuscripts that bump the date of a word’s first attestation back a few centuries? And 
with regard to etymological meanings, are we willing to defer back to Proto-Indo-
European, or do we stop at Old French or maybe Latin? And to set the record straight, if 
we are going to be taking context into account, are we looking at phrases or longer 
passages, what are the boundaries of these passages, and how are they determined? 
 For our current project, we will simply note that answers to these deconstructive 
questions are likely to solidify the link between literal meaning and minimally competent 
interlocutors. The average person has a reasonably good grasp of the primary meaning of 
words in their active vocabulary without the need for up-to-date analysis of compendiums 
of usage. Some words may have two or more senses that seem equally qualified as 
candidates for “primary” meaning, but words are not spoken in a vacuum, and the 
surrounding context usually makes clear to a normal language user which sense of 
polysemous words contributes to the literal meaning of the surrounding phrase, sentence, 
etc. The amount of context needed to determine literal meaning varies, but a typical 




confidence that they have understood the literal meaning. Echoing a certain Supreme 
Court Justice, we might say, “I cannot define literal meaning, but I still know it when I 
see it.”  
 We may indeed know literal meaning when we see it, but curiously what we see is 
not what we tend to say out loud. In this section, we have been examining evidence that 
tacitness is an underlying assumption of several common conceptualizations of literal 
meaning despite the term’s absence from most formal definitions of literal. We have 
looked at the standard pragmatic model of metaphor comprehension and Sam 
Glucksberg’s critique of that model, and we have examined prototypical definitions of 
literal exemplified by the OED and possible answers to a deconstructive reading of the 
contradictions in this definition. In each of these examples, we have seen that literal 
meaning, whatever else it may be, is tacitly understood by minimally competent 
interlocutors. One might expect, then, that the meanings we describe as literal would tend 
to coincide with what a typical language user understands tacitly. But as we will see in 
the examples that follow below and continue in Chapter 2, this is not usually the case. 
Explicitly literal interpretation (what we describe as literal) tends to diverge from tacitly 
literal interpretation (what we should describe as literal if we truly believed that 
minimally competent interlocutors are exemplars). 
Applying the Litmus Test to Two Texts That Privilege Literal Interpretation of the 
Bible 
 Recall from above that the OED lists possible exclusionary criteria that might 
keep the most contextually appropriate meaning of a message from being considered its 




significance.” We will now consider two fringe definitions of literal interpretation that do 
not allow for any of these exclusionary criteria, instead deferring doggedly to 
contextually appropriate meaning, whatever that may be. In both cases, literal meaning is 
equated with authorial intent, even when this overlaps with what we would otherwise 
consider figurative and, therefore, antithetical to literal meaning.  
 Our first text comes from Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica. Near the 
beginning of his magnum opus, Aquinas claims, “[T]he literal sense is that which the 
author intends, and […] the author of Holy Writ is God.”16 Aquinas also specifies that if 
God, the author, intends it as such, then the Bible’s literal meaning can be what we might 
otherwise describe as metaphorical: “When Scripture speaks of God’s arm, the literal 
sense is not that God has such a member, but only what is signified by this member, 
namely operative power.”17 Let us begin by asking the first question in our litmus test: 
1. Does the use of literal in a given instance of explicitly literal interpretation 
either privilege or disparage the meaning it identifies, or is it merely used as a 
neutral term in order to make a helpful distinction? 
 
Aquinas equates literal meaning with what God, as author, intends; clearly, he privileges 
literal meaning. While he does make a helpful distinction between two senses of God’s 
arm, this is far from a “mere” distinction. Aquinas would not be saying the same thing if 
we substituted different for literal: “the [different] sense is that which the author intends, 
and […] [T]he author of Holy Writ is God.” Or, “When Scripture speaks of God’s arm, 
the [different] sense is not that God has such a member, but only what is signified by this 
member, namely operative power.” For Aquinas, it is vital that one not only see operative 
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power as the correct interpretation of “God’s arm” but also as its literal interpretation. 
Moving on to our second question: 
2. If the designated literal meaning is either privileged or disparaged, is this 
because it is thought to be tacit to minimally competent interlocutors? 
 
 In this case our answer is a bit complicated because Aquinas privileges literal 
meaning for two reasons: (1) it is what God, the most maximally competent interlocutor 
possible, intends and (2) it is what God’s people, as minimally competent interlocutors, 
understand. The surrounding context makes it clear how important it is for Aquinas that 
his hermeneutic not only align with orthodox Christian teaching but also be perceived as 
easy to understand. It is not enough for God’s Word to be true; it must also be simple, for 
he is responding to the notion that “many different senses in one text produce confusion 
and deception and destroy all force of argument.”18 Aquinas acknowledges that there are 
spiritual senses, but denies that this results in any confusion, “for all the senses are 
founded on one—the literal—from which alone can any argument be drawn, and not 
from those intended in allegory.”19 The implication is that even if the spiritual senses are 
harder to understand, they are founded on literal meaning, which is plain for all to see. 
Aquinas concludes with the bold claim that, even if the mysteries of the spiritual senses 
remain hidden to some people, “nothing of Holy Scripture perishes on account of this, 
since nothing necessary to faith is contained under the spiritual sense which is not 
elsewhere put forward by the Scripture in its literal sense.”20 For Aquinas, it is vital that 
spiritual truths, which may be harder to understand, be superfluous, inessential, and 
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dispensable. The sense that God intends must be the same as the sense most readily 
understood whenever God’s people read God’s Word. This brings us to our third 
question: 
3. Is this meaning in fact tacit to minimally competent interlocutors? 
 
 On the one hand, yes, the meaning of “operative power” is tacit to minimally 
competent interlocutors when they read of “God’s arm” in the Bible. As Glucksberg has 
shown, apt metaphors are understood just as readily as sensible literal statements, but 
Glucksberg would still call this a metaphor. Most likely, the reader can agree with 
Aquinas’s distinction and his assessment of the correct meaning of “God’s arm,” but we 
are more likely to parse the distinction like the modern-day Expositors Dictionary of 
Bible Words: “It is the non-literal usage of [‘arm’] that is most significant. In these 
passages, the senses of ‘arm’ are metaphorical, referring basically to the phenomena of 
power and strength on both the divine and human level.”21 Why does Aquinas not only 
insist that “God’s arm” means “God’s power,” but also that this is the literal meaning of 
“God’s arm,” rather than its metaphorical meaning? This is not just backwards to our 
modern sensibilities; it is a reversal of Augustine’s teaching on the matter as well: 
Now to think of God as forming man from the slime of the earth with bodily 
hands is childish. Indeed, if Scripture had said such a thing, we should be 
compelled to believe that the writer had used a metaphor rather than that God is 
contained in the structure of members such as we know in our bodies. 
 For it is said, “Thy hand hath scattered the nations (Ps 44:2),” and, “Thou 
didst bring Thy people forth with a strong hand and outstretched arm (Ps 
136:12).” But anyone in his right mind understands that the name of the bodily 
member has been used in these passages for the power and might of God.22  
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 Aquinas’s wording also suggests that even his contemporary audience would have 
imagined a bodily limb of flesh and bone when asked to describe the literal meaning of 
“God’s arm,” for there is no reason to write, “the literal sense is not that God has such a 
member…” unless you expect your audience to assume the literal sense is that God does 
indeed have such a member, while the metaphorical sense is that God is powerful. It 
would seem Aquinas draws his o like most others would draw an e. We can learn to 
decipher his handwriting and read him charitably with a few moments of familiarity 
because language still works so long as distinctions are still being made, but we must not 
confuse accepting Aquinas’s distinction between operative power and a bodily member 
with accepting his reversal of which interpretation warrants the name literal. Aquinas’s 
reversal may not be malicious. As Saussure reminds us, “It is precisely because the terms 
a and b as such are radically incapable of reaching the level of consciousness—one is 
always conscious of only the a/b difference—that each term is free to change.”23 But the 
effect of Aquinas’s reversal is to collapse the distinction between what God means and 
what God’s people understand tacitly. By illustrating his reversal with the relatively 
noncontroversial example of God’s arm, Aquinas (perhaps unintentionally) masks the 
reality that he is deferring literal meaning—not to God’s intent—but to his interpretation 
of God’s intent, which he will then portray to his readers as if it were plain and obvious 
to them prior to reading his lengthy and persuasive arguments on various subjects.  
 In 1982, more than seven hundred years after Aquinas wrote his Summa, the 
International Council on Biblical Inerrancy (ICBI) drafted the Chicago Statement on 
Biblical Hermeneutics (CSBH), intended as a companion to their earlier Chicago 
                                                




Statement on Biblical Inerrancy (CSBI). In the CSBH, they affirm the literal 
interpretation of Scripture and define it as follows: 
Article XV 
 
WE AFFIRM the necessity of interpreting the Bible according to its literal, or 
normal, sense. The literal sense is the grammatical-historical sense, that is, the 
meaning which the writer expressed. Interpretation according to the literal sense 
will take account of all figures of speech and literary forms found in the text. 
 
WE DENY the legitimacy of any approach to Scripture that attributes to it 
meaning which the literal sense does not support.24 
 
 This brief quotation makes it easy to quickly answer the first two parts of our 
litmus test. With regard to the first part, literal interpretation is clearly privileged by the 
CSBH. It is affirmed as a “necessity,” and meaning unsupported by the literal sense is 
explicitly denied as illegitimate. With regard to the second part of our test, the fact that 
the word normal is presented as synonymous with literal suggests that literal meaning is 
perceived as being tacit to minimally competent interlocutors. However, the addition of 
the technical term grammatical-historical (which is also presented as synonymous), 
combined with the assertion that literal meaning “will take account of all figures of 
speech,” complicates matters. The Evangelical Dictionary of Theology lists five aspects 
of a biblical passage’s context that grammatical-historical exegesis seeks to understand: 
biblical languages, types of literature, historical background, geographical conditions, 
and life setting.25 All of this implies a method of analysis more accessible to Bible 
scholars, seminary graduates, and other maximally competent interlocutors than the 
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minimally competent laity. Ideally, this type of expert analysis would arrive at “the 
meaning which the writer expressed,” and it would certainly strive to “take account of all 
figures of speech and literary forms found in the text.” It seems, then, that the technical 
term grammatical-historical is a more precise descriptor of what the statement actually 
seeks to affirm, and that literal is the odd term out.  
 Norman L. Geisler’s official ICBI-sanctioned commentary on the CSBH nearly 
admits as much: “To be sure the English word literal carries some problematic 
connotations with it. Hence the words normal and grammatical-historical are used to 
explain what is meant.”26 Why, then, did those assembled insist on including the 
“problematic” word literal front and center in such a carefully worded and extensively 
revised document? I think because there is no other word that can blur the distinction 
between maximally and minimally competent interlocutors as effectively as literal. The 
framers employ the term literal, not in spite of its “problematic connotations,” but 
precisely because of them. The pliability of this term is what allows those who affirm 
biblical inerrancy to assert in a single breath that one must consult the Hebrew to 
properly understand a certain passage in the Old Testament, that another was not fully 
appreciated as a typology prefiguring Christ until many centuries later, and that, with 
good translations and the spiritual gift of Christian hindsight, all of this should be clear to 
a twentieth-century layperson. And it is very important to these co-signers that the 
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meaning of biblical passages (yes, they believe there is only one27) be capable of being 
understood tacitly by the simplest member of God’s family: 
Article XXIII 
 
WE AFFIRM the clarity of Scripture and specifically of its message about 
salvation from sin. 
 
WE DENY that all passages of Scripture are equally clear or have equal bearing on 




WE AFFIRM that a person is not dependent for understanding of Scripture on the 
expertise of biblical scholars. 
 
WE DENY that a person should ignore the fruits of the technical study of Scripture 
by biblical scholars.28 
 
 Notwithstanding the caveats in each article’s denial, it is difficult to maintain that 
the meaning of Scripture is clear to those who lack training in the finer points of biblical 
exegesis while still affirming the grammatical-historical method as the surest strategy for 
correct interpretation. The CSBH manages this by recasting literal as a technical term 
that conflates the “normal” sense, the “grammatical-historical sense,” and “the meaning 
which the writer expressed” into one concept. Thus the “normal” meaning understood by 
an average modern-day reader is the same as what the author intended, which is the same 
as the meaning derived by biblical scholars, because all these interlocutors are at least 
minimally competent and share an unspoken understanding between them through the 
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work of the Holy Spirit. The CSBH employs the term literal, not in spite of its 
“problematic connotations,” but precisely because of them. 
 Saussure writes that “any conceptual difference perceived by the mind seeks to 
find expression through a distinct signifier, and two ideas that are no longer distinct in the 
mind tend to merge into the same signifier.”29 Both trends are at play here. Not only does 
the CSBH tend to merge the understandings of biblical scholars and laity (as we have just 
seen), it simultaneously seeks to distinguish between one type of biblical scholar and 
another. The term grammatical-historical is rare outside evangelical circles, and the 
preferred term for analysis that accounts for literary and historical context in more liberal 
scholarship is historical-critical. The Evangelical Dictionary of Theology asserts that this 
method theoretically has similar goals to the preferred grammatical-historical method, but 
with the fatal flaw of rejecting, a priori, the possibility of the supernatural.30 On the other 
hand, scholars dedicated to the historical-critical method might say that the evangelical 
version has similar goals but bears the fatal flaw of assuming, a priori, that most passages 
of the Bible correspond to historical fact.31  
 Taking account “of all figures of speech and literary forms found in the text,” 
many historical-critical scholars have concluded that Jonah is a genre-bending anomaly. 
Organized canonically as one of the minor prophets, the entire book contains only a 
single line of prophecy: “Forty days hence, and Nineveh shall be destroyed!” (3:4). 
Nevertheless, the terse announcement of doom results in overblown repentance on the 
part of the Assyrians (and their animals! [3:5-8]) rivaled in hyperbole only by Jonah’s 
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original rebellion in feeing to the westernmost edge of the known world when God had 
commanded him to go east (1:1-3). Ironically, the success of Jonah’s preaching 
technically renders him a false prophet according to the litmus test outlined in Deut 
18:22: “If a prophet speaks in the name of the LORD but the thing does not take place or 
prove true, it is a word that the LORD has not spoken. The prophet has spoken it 
presumptuously; do not be frightened by it.” Nineveh itself is described with the 
implausibly large diameter of a three days’ walk (3:4), (which is especially surprising 
given that the population supposedly maxes out somewhere around a hundred twenty 
thousand [4:11]), and Jonah’s response to the loss of his shade is the melodramatic 
pronouncement that he should probably just go ahead and die (4:8). All of these 
peculiarities have led historical-critical scholars to suggest that the text itself does not 
present itself as history, but Geisler’s commentary on the CSBH specifically rejects this 
possibility, arguing that Jesus’s words in Matt 12:40-42 refer to Jonah as a historical 
person.32 Article XXII represents the only place where the CSBH itself (as opposed to 
Geisler’s commentary) singles out a particular interpretation of a specific passage: 
Article XXII 
 
WE AFFIRM that Genesis 1–11 is factual, as is the rest of the book. 
 
WE DENY that the teachings of Genesis 1–11 are mythical and that scientific 
hypotheses about earth history or the origin of humanity may be invoked to 
overthrow what Scripture teaches about creation.33 
 
 Geissler’s commentary offers some interesting behind-the-scenes information 
about which science-driven reinterpretations are allowable under the wording of this 
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Article and which are not. The Article is meant to explicitly deny “theistic varieties” of 
“belief in macro-evolution,” but “the question of the age of the earth” is intentionally 
“left open.” For a person who denies that church councils have authority over plain-as-
day Scripture, Geissler’s reasoning for this openness is interesting: “there is no unanimity 
among evangelicals.”34 Here Derrida would have us catch a glimpse of where literal 
meaning is ultimately deferred: unanimity among evangelicals. Literal meaning is not 
that which is tacit to just any minimally competent interlocutor, nor to the consensus of 
all biblical scholars considered together, but only to a small community of maximally 
competent evangelical scholars who follow the grammatical-historical method, which 
somehow precludes belief in theistic macro-evolution but remains agnostic on whether 
the generations tabulated throughout the Bible should be calculated to support young 
earth creationism.  
 Here it will be worth comparing and contrasting the CSBH with Aquinas’s 
comments in the Summa. Like Aquinas, the framers of the CSBH would agree that the 
literal meaning of God’s arm is power since literal meaning is taken to be inclusive of 
figurative language in their model. Also like Aquinas, the CSBH ultimately equates 
literal meaning with God’s intent when considered in tandem with the earlier CSBI: 
The theological reality of inspiration in the producing of Biblical documents 
corresponds to that of spoken prophecies: although the human writers’ 
personalities were expressed in what they wrote, the words were divinely 
constituted. Thus, what Scripture says, God says; its authority is His authority, for 
He is its ultimate Author, having given it through the minds and words of chosen 
and prepared men who in freedom and faithfulness “spoke from God as they were 
                                                





carried along by the Holy Spirit (2 Pet 1:21).” Holy Scripture must be 
acknowledged as the Word of God by virtue of its divine origin.35 
 
On other matters, such as the CSBI’s denial in Article II “that Church creeds, councils, or 
declarations have authority greater than or equal to the authority of the Bible,”36 the 
framers part ways with Aquinas. They may have done well, however, to heed Aquinas’s 
warning from the Summa, with which he introduced his discussion of the second day of 
creation: 
In discussing questions of this kind two rules are to be observed, as Augustine 
teaches. The first is, to hold the truth of Scripture without wavering. The second is 
that since Holy Scripture can be explained in a multiplicity of senses, one should 
adhere to a particular explanation, only in such measure as to be ready to abandon 
it, if it be proved with certainty to be false; lest Holy Scripture be exposed to the 
ridicule of unbelievers, and obstacles be placed to their believing.37 
 
 In their zeal for Augustine’s first rule, the framers of the CSBH may have 
neglected the second. Aquinas, meanwhile, warns against over-committing oneself and 
defers meaning to a possible future where previously held interpretations might have to 
be abandoned. If there comes a day when those who subscribe to the CSBH abandon a 
previously held interpretation, it will be interesting to see whether they will find 
expression through a new and distinct signifier, or recast literal meaning again in their 
own image.  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we have explored what is meant by the questions in our three-part 
litmus test and applied the test to two cases in which the literal meaning of Scripture is 
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privileged. I believe these examples are timely in an age when 24% of Americans agree 
with the statement, “The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word 
for word,” but it would be a mistake to assume that the phenomenon of describing as 
literal precisely those interpretations which diverge from the tacit understanding of 
minimally competent interlocutors is limited only to those who privilege the literal 
interpretation of Scripture. As the examples in the following chapter will show, this 
tendency is woven into the very fabric of language itself. This suggests that most of us 
are predisposed to make explicitly literal interpretations that contradict the typical 
assumption that literal meaning is tacit to minimally competent interlocutors and that the 
slippery statements sometimes made by those who privilege the literal interpretation of 
Scripture may not be intentionally duplicitous.
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CHAPTER II 
EXPLICITLY LITERAL INTERPRETATION AND INCOMPETENT OR 
MAXIMALLY COMPETENT INTERLOCUTORS
The purpose of this chapter is to show that our collective propensity for 
describing as literal precisely those interpretations that deviate from what is tacit to 
minimally competent interlocutors is not limited to those who privilege the literal 
meaning of Scripture for theological reasons. We will begin by looking at the intensive 
and superfluous uses of literally in light of Paul Grice’s cooperative principle, which 
predicts that audiences try to interpret each word a speaker chooses to include as 
significant. Applied to situations where speakers use the word literal in their utterance to 
guide audience interpretation of their words, this leads us to the counterintuitive 
realization that we use the word only if we predict that the meaning we wish to convey 
would not otherwise be tacit to minimally competent interlocutors. We will then shift our 
focus to situations where speakers use literal to describe other people’s interpretations 
and find that we tend to use it only for those we deem either incompetent or maximally 
competent. At the end of the chapter, we will return to another text that privileges the 
literal meaning of Scripture and includes the earliest attestation of literal in English 
recorded by the OED. The strange usage in this text will demonstrate that the 
phenomenon we have been examining is not a corruption of a once unspoiled state, but 
has been the norm ever since this peculiar little word’s introduction into our language.  
38 
Grice’s Cooperative Principle and the Intensive and “Superfluous” Uses of Literally 
Paul Grice first outlined his concept of the cooperative principle in his essay, 
“Logic and Conversation.” Although the maxims he puts forward in this essay sound like 
prescriptive advice, they are intended to describe general truths about how language 
works. As Grice explains: 
Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected 
remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are characteristically, to 
some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, 
to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually 
accepted direction. This purpose or direction may be fixed from the start (e.g., by 
an initial proposal of a question for discussion), or it may evolve during the 
exchange; it may be fairly definite, or it may be so indefinite as to leave very 
considerable latitude to the participants (as in a casual conversation). But at each 
stage, some possible conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally 
unsuitable.1  
Grice goes on to describe four categories of maxims that, generally speaking, demarcate 
conversationally unsuitable moves. The two that are relevant to our current inquiry are 
Grice’s maxim of quantity, which includes the submaxim, “Do not make your 
contribution more informative than is required,”2 and his maxim of manner, which 
includes the submaxim, “Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).”3 Grice writes that a 
possible consequence of flouting the maxim of quantity is that “hearers may be misled as 
a result of thinking that there is some particular POINT in the provision of the excess 
information [emphasis original].”4 It follows from this observation that speakers who do 
in fact have a particular point to make by including the word literal or literally in their 
utterance do not flout Grice’s maxim. This leads us to a paradoxical conclusion. A 





speaker who includes literal or literally (l) in their utterance follows Grice’s cooperative 
principle if and only if the speaker believes that saying what they want to say (x) runs the 
risk of miscommunication, while including literal or literally along with what they want 
to say (x + l) lessens the risk of miscommunication. This means that, at least in the 
speaker’s estimation, including l will guide the audience (presumably comprised of 
minimally competent interlocutors) to some interpretation other than the interpretation 
that would have come most naturally to them, had the speaker said x without l. Our 
judgments regarding whether the speaker was right to include l follow the same criteria: 
if we think a minimally competent interpreter was unlikely to understand the speaker’s 
intended meaning upon hearing x without l, and if x + l seems to increase the chances of 
correct understanding (or if we can at least acknowledge that the speaker thought or 
hoped it would improve communication), then we tend rule in favor of the speaker’s 
choice to include l. 
We can illustrate with two opposite reactions to a merely hungry person who says, 
“I’m literally starving”: one objecting and the other accepting. If one objects to the usage, 
one might argue that it waters down the meaning of literally and makes it difficult or 
impossible for those who use the word correctly to communicate effectively. H. W. 
Fowler, in his early-20th-century A Dictionary of Modern English Usage, complained, 
“We have come to such a pass with this emphasizer that where the truth would require us 
to insert with a strong expression, ‘not literally, of course, but in a manner of speaking,’ 
we do not hesitate to insert the very word we should be at pains to repudiate […] such 
false coin makes honest traffic in words impossible.”5 According to this sentiment, if a 
5. Henry Watson Fowler, A Dictionary of Modern English Usage (Ware, Hertfordshire:




situation arises where it is necessary to say, “I’m literally starving,” in order to convey 
actual life-threatening malnourishment, it will no longer be possible to do so. An 
unavoidable corollary to this line of thinking is the acknowledgement that, in cases where 
one deems it absolutely necessary to use the word literally (rather than merely helpful), 
one thinks the meaning of the word or phrase x is different from the meaning conveyed 
by x + l. If one believes it is necessary in a given context to say “I’m literally starving” in 
order to convey actual life-threatening malnourishment, then one also believes that the 
tacit meaning of “I’m starving”—taken in context and without the inclusion of l—would 
have been “I’m very hungry” in that particular instance. 
 Those who accept a merely hungry person’s complaint of literal starvation might 
point out that the intensive use dates back centuries,6 appears in other languages besides 
English,7 and has now become the most common use of literally in contemporary 
English.8 Sheidlower, for example, defends the intensive use on the grounds that it is 
widespread “even in the works of the authors we are often told to emulate” and seems to 
have enjoyed more than a century of general acceptance prior to any modern objections.9 
If we are willing to accept the intensive usage as a fact of life, we will see that the 
speaker who deliberately says, “I’m literally starving” to communicate “I’m really 
hungry” does so because they think alternative statements (such as the slightly less 
                                                
 6. Jesse Sheidlower, “The Word We Love to Hate: Literally,” Slate, 1 Nov 2005, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/the_good_word/2005/11/the_word_we_love_to_hate.html. 
 
 7. See footnote 9 from introduction. 
 
 8. This is why dictionaries marketed to second-language learners, which tend to organize entries 
according to frequency of use rather than earliest attestation, sometimes include the intensive use of 
literally as the primary definition under its headword. For example, although its editors include a 
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Collins COBUILD Advanced Learner’s Dictionary has to say about literally is “You can use literally to 
emphasize a statement” (Bishopbriggs, Glasgow: HarperCollins, 2005), 840. 
 




hyperbolic “I’m starving,” without literally, or the accurate but bland “I’m really 
hungry”) will not convey the appropriate severity of gastronomic discomfort to the 
audience. Emphasis, then, is a sort of affirmative action the speaker employs to 
counteract the speaker’s expectation that the audience will not take the words seriously 
enough.10 Thus, a more accepting response still reiterates that a speaker’s choice to make 
an interpretation explicitly literal by adding l coincides with a speaker’s prediction 
(whether accurate or false) that what they want to say would not otherwise be understood 
by minimally competent interlocutors. 
 Therefore both responses to the intensive usage show that speakers use the word 
literally in their utterances to guide audiences toward interpretations that the speaker 
deems non-tacit. The reverse is also true: when audiences encounter the word literally, 
they treat it as a cue to reinterpret their initial tacit understanding of what the speaker was 
trying to communicate. This is why seemingly superfluous uses of literally tend to bother 
us. The Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary describes this use as synonymous 
with simply or just and offers the example, “Then you literally cut the sausage down the 
middle.”11 Literally, A Web Log12 developed a system of tagging some examples 
                                                
 10. Prescriptive style guides have rightly pointed out that there seems to be no end to this arms 
race of hyperbole. Wynford Hicks, in Quite Literally: Problem Words and How to Use Them, (London: 
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presidential candidate Joe Biden included one instance of emphatic reduplication (“literally, literally”) and 
the even more insistent “literally, not figuratively, literally.” But regardless of how successful or ill-advised 
such attempts at emphasis may be, the fact remains that those who use literally as an intensive do so 
because they believe the construction x + l will help their audience come nearer to their intended meaning 
than x alone. 
 





“incorrect” and others “unnecessary” to distinguish between the two types of “abuse.” 
Several snippets from CNN news coverage of the 2008 Iowa caucuses were tagged as 
“unnecessary,” including John Edwards’s “Tomorrow morning, 37 million of our own 
people will wake up literally worried about feeding and clothing their own children,”13 
and Mike Huckabee’s “We also want to say thanks to our three children who are with us 
tonight […] [o]ur older son John Mark, our son David, his wife Lauren, our daughter 
Sarah, who’s literally lived in Iowa for the past two and a half months.”14  
  When these “unnecessary” or superfluous uses are denounced, the argument is 
that, while the statement may be factually correct, literally should not be included unless 
the audience would be likely to misinterpret the statement if the adverb were not present. 
But it is likely that most of the examples that could be construed as superfluous are not 
intended as such by the speaker. Two readers of Literally, A Web Log came to 
Huckabee’s defense, each with a different theory regarding the possible intent behind his 
choice to include the word literally in the statement that his daughter had lived in Iowa 
for the past two and a half months. One reader suggested that that members of 
Huckabee’s family might have “changed their permanent residence, sold their old home 
and bought a new house or rented an apartment, changed the address on their drivers 
licenses, enrolled their children in new schools, and changed job locations.”15 Another 
                                                                                                                                            
 12. The stated purpose of this blog, which has since gone defunct, was “tracking the use and abuse 
of the word ‘literally.’” 
 
 13. John Edwards, speech to supporters at Iowa caucus, 3 Jan 2008, “Barack Obama and Mike 
Huckabee Win Big in Iowa,” transcript, CNN, 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0801/03/se.03.html. 
 14. Mike Huckabee, Ibid. 
 
 15. M Sinclair Stevens, comment 17 Jan 2008, on Fitz, “Literally the Future of Our Country,” 




opined that perhaps Huckabee meant to emphasize that they had “stayed within the 
borders of the state, continuously, for the time period stated.”16 The thrust of both 
explanations is that in order for Huckabee’s use to be correct, rather than superfluous, the 
inclusion of literally must be an attempt to guide the audience toward an interpretation of 
“lived in Iowa for two and a half months” that is different from what our most natural 
understanding of “lived in Iowa for two and a half months” would otherwise have been. 
Once again, we see that the speaker’s use of l is judged correct if and only if the 
explicitly literal interpretation the speaker is trying to highlight is different from the 
interpretation that—at least in the speaker’s estimation—would otherwise have been most 
tacit to the intended audience. 
 The result of our expectation that speakers will follow the cooperative principle is 
that, when we encounter l in their speech, we treat it is a clue to reevaluate the words they 
have just spoken, rather than as a nonsensical sign meaning “interpret my words just as 
you would have, had I not included this one.” This leads us into the strange position of 
accepting explicitly literal interpretations that employ word play, puns, and double 
entendres—things normally considered antithetical to literal meaning. Because these uses 
of l follow the cooperative principle, they are not criticized as often as the intensive and 
superfluous uses, despite their eccentricity. Consider the following one-liners, which each 
rely on the inclusion of l to help audiences catch the joke:  
1. A ton of people is literally 12 to 15 people.17 




 16. Chris, comment 18 Jan 2008, Ibid. 
 






2. Spacesuits are literally made to protect astronauts from nothing.18 
3. Peter Dinklage is literally a white dwarf star.19 
4. Childbirth is literally an emergency.20 
5. We come from where we come from, literally.21  
 
 In the first example, l serves as a clue to interpret ton as a measure of weight 
rather than number, and the joke depends on the expectation that the audience would 
more naturally interpret ton as a measure of number when used to describe people and 
consider 12 to 15 too few (and oddly specific) to warrant the description. The second 
example recognizes that we would not normally consider nothing a danger we need to be 
protected from.22 The third example refers to an Emmy award-winning actor of European 
ancestry, who was born with achondroplasia. Of course, the three-word phrase white 
dwarf star more commonly refers to a stable, relatively cold star that does not undergo 
nuclear fusion but avoids gravitational collapse into a black hole by the repulsion of 
electrons. Even when analyzed word-by-word, two out of the phrase’s three components 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 18. cyberk25, submission to /r/Showerthoughts, 15 May 2014, 
https://www.reddit.com/r/Showerthoughts/comments/25l43m/spacesuits_are_literally_made_to_protect/. 
 




 20. submission to /r/Showerthoughts, 2 Dec 2013, 
https://www.reddit.com/r/Showerthoughts/comments/1rxg9b/childbirth_is_literally_an_emergency/.  
 




 22. A pseudo-scientific defense of the smart aleck’s use of l here might point out that the vacuum 
of space is, technically speaking, closer to the absolute meaning of nothing than what we find in everyday 
speech (for example, we say “There is nothing on my plate,” when there are still crumbs, the last bit of 
sauce, and the atmosphere above and around everything on Earth, or “I’ve done nothing today,” when we 
have actually been breathing, metabolizing, letting our thoughts wander, and watching television). 
However, the meaning of nothing is always context dependent, and spacesuits protect astronauts from 
additional “things” besides the vacuum of space, such as solar radiation. Furthermore, even if we allow that 
the nothing of outer space is closer to the absolute meaning of nothing than the nothing of everyday speech, 





have meanings closer to their core definitions when used to describe a celestial body 
rather than a human being: white and star. Yet in this example, including the word 
literally helps interpreters access tertiary definitions for two of the phrase’s components 
and switch a general meaning of dwarf for a more specific one even though the general 
meaning of relative smallness would usually be the preferred meaning in the context of 
the full phrase.  
 In these first three examples, while including l certainly gives the audience a 
better chance of understanding the joke, it may not be absolutely necessary. The 
incongruity of describing a few people as a ton of people, of needing protection from 
nothing, and of using the term for a rather specific kind of astronomical phenomenon to 
describe a living person would perhaps offer enough of a clue that the words must be 
reevaluated to be properly understood. However, in the last two examples, there would be 
little reason to reevaluate the one-liner for a hidden meaning if l were not included. 
Because labor is considered a medical emergency, the audience might take the statement 
“Childbirth is an emergency,” at face value if l were not included. The addition of l 
discourages, rather than encourages, taking the joke at face value and hints that the author 
intends a play on the word emerge.23 As for our final example, the statement “We come 
from where we come from,” sounds tautological without l. Tautology violates Grice’s 
cooperative principle by flouting the maxim of relevance, which should be enough to 
make the audience seek a less straightforward meaning, but perhaps not enough to help 
interpreters catch on to the crude nature of the joke. Without l, “We come from where we 
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natural interpretation of the sentence, “Childbirth is an emergency.” However, awareness of this 




come from” could be interpreted as a blasé statement about the futility of trying to change 
a person’s background, similar to what the idiom “boys will be boys” says about a 
person’s nature. Adding l to the equation helps the reader understand that the first come 
in this one-liner refers to genetic origins, while the second refers to male ejaculation. In 
all five of these examples, the jokester includes l to guide their audience toward an 
interpretation of the one-liner that is quite different from the interpretation that would 
otherwise be tacitly understood by a minimally competent interlocutor. 
Disparaging Incompetent and Maximally Competent Interlocutors 
 In the previous section, we looked at various situations in which speakers include 
l in their utterance to guide audience interpretation. In each of these cases, we have seen 
that the speaker’s use and audience’s interpretation of l leads away from the meaning 
assumed to be tacit to minimally competent interlocutors. We now turn to situations 
where one uses l, not to guide audience interpretation of one’s own statement, but to 
describe the interpretations of others. Overwhelmingly, those we describe as literal-
minded correspond to those we perceive as either incompetent or maximally competent.  
 A prime example of an incompetent interlocutor we describe as literal is found in 
the children’s book character Amelia Bedelia, created by Peggy Parrish. At first glance, it 
may seem Bedelia’s problem is that she always ascribes a single meaning to a single 
word: after all, she ices fish the same way she ices a cake,24 and she catches a fish25 the 
same way she catches a ball.26 But what truly defines Bedelia’s literal-mindedness is that, 
                                                
 24. Peggy Parrish, Amelia Bedelia and the Surprise Shower (New York: HarperCollins, 1995; 
repr., 1966), 19–21. 
 
 25. Parrish, Amelia Bedelia Goes Camping (New York: Greenwillow, 1985), 18–21.  
 
 26. Parrish, Play Ball, Amelia Bedelia (New York: HarperCollins, 1972), 42–44. 
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whatever meaning her employers intend and whatever meaning seems most natural to the 
reader in context, Bedelia interprets things a different way. She is apparently capable of 
understanding that the word trim can mean both “cut” and “decorate,” but when Mrs. 
Rogers asks her to, “trim the fat before you put the steak in the ice box,” Bedelia 
decorates the fat with ribbons and lace,27 and when Mrs. Rogers instructs her to, “Trim 
the [Christmas] tree,” Bedelia prunes it with garden shears.28 Likewise, she understands 
two possible meanings of the noun camp: one emphasizing location (a camp might be a 
particular place set aside for habitual camping, often containing permanent structures that 
are difficult to erect before nightfall), and another emphasizing function (a camp might be 
any place where one chooses to camp for the night). What makes Bedelia literal-minded 
is that, whichever sense of camp Mr. Rogers and the reader will understand from context, 
Bedelia will be thinking of the opposite one: 
Amelia Bedelia looked all around.  
“But where is the camp?” she asked.  
“The camp is in the car,” said Mr. Rogers.  
“In the car!” said Amelia Bedelia. “We’re going to camp in the car?”  
“The things we need to make the camp are in the car,” said Mr. Rogers. 
“Make the camp!” said Amelia Bedelia. “We have to make the camp?”  
“Just forget it,” said Mr. Rogers.”29 
The fun of reading the stories is that the reader knows Bedelia will misinterpret 
things on account of her literal-mindedness, but does not know how. When told to 
“check” the shirts that have been delivered by a laundry service, the reader might expect 
27. Parrish, Amelia Bedelia (New York: Harper & Row, 1983; repr. 1963), [no page numbers in
this edition]. 
28. Parrish, Merry Christmas, Amelia Bedelia (New York: Greenwillow, 1986), 36–37.




her to draw check marks on them (she ends up “checkering” them with red squares),30 but 
one thing the reader knows for sure is that she will not simply count them to see if any 
are missing. Stories about maximally competent interlocutors such as genies are fun for 
the same reason: we know these entities will play with language, but we do not know 
exactly how. Their literal interpretations of wishes not only diverge from the meaning 
tacit to ill-fated protagonists; they are also beyond the ability of minimally competent 
readers to predict—even when the reader expects something devious. If the genie is 
presented with a request for a million bucks, the reader does not know if our naïve hero 
will end up with a million male deer, a million oxford shoes, or a horse that is impossible 
to ride, but the reader does know the genie will certainly not bestow one million USD 
(unless our wish-maker is the beneficiary to a loved one’s life insurance policy, or unless 
the cash appears instantaneously in the form of cascading pennies falling like hail upon 
the defenseless protagonist’s head). Relative to both hero and reader, then, genies are 
maximally competent interlocutors, able to outwit and surprise us. And just as with 
Amelia Bedelia, who continues to surprise us with new depths of dimwittedness, the 
further these characters venture from what is tacit to minimally competent interlocutors, 
the more literal they seem to us. When Antonio forfeits his loan in The Merchant of 
Venice, the human trickster Shylock demands from Antonio a pound of his own flesh 
according to a maliciously literal reading of their contract.31 Yet Antonio is saved by 
                                                
 30. Parrish, Thank You, Amelia Bedelia (New York: HarperCollins, 1993; repr. 1964). 14–19. 
 
 31. Critics Sergio Costola and Michael Saenger manage to describe Shylock with a form of the 
word literal six times in a single paragraph in their essay “Shylock’s Venice and the Grammar of the 
Modern City” in Shakespeare and the Italian Renaissance: Appropriation, Transformation, Opposition, ed. 
Michelle Marrapondi (New York: Routledge, 2016), 151: “As many have noted, Shylock’s perverse 
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collateral of Antonio’s loan, desiring a pound of flesh, and this literal reading of their contract ties to 




Portia, who outsmarts Shylock by “out-literaling” him three times over. First, she argues 
that since Shylock’s contract only mentions flesh, he is legally bound to complete the 
impossible task of removing a pound from Antonio’s body without spilling a single drop 
of blood.32 Second, he must remove neither more nor less than one pound exactly; the 
scale may not budge by even “the estimation of a hair.”33 Third, when Shylock admits 
defeat and reluctantly accepts a prior offer of monetary compensation for Antonio’s 
defaulted loan, Portia reminds everyone that he has already refused this offer in open 
court, and declared himself that he will have nothing but the pound of flesh.34 
 Children are often considered to represent another prime example of literal-
mindedness. An introductory linguistics textbook has this to say about their language 
development: “[O]ne child, knowing that say means ‘to utter’, said about a sign: ‘The 
sign wrote…’ rather than ‘The sign said…’ She had not yet learned the metaphorical 
meaning of say.”35 This struck me as an odd way of putting it when I read the textbook as 
a student. While it is probably true this child did not know the metaphorical meaning of 
say, she invented a novel metaphorical meaning for wrote to compensate, so it is not as if 
metaphor comprehension as such were beyond this child’s capabilities. The standard 
expression and the child’s novel one both anthropomorphize the sign. No fluent speaker 
of English is likely to reinvent this child’s creative expression, and neither, perhaps, is 
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any other child. To be sure, all children misunderstand adult speech at one time or 
another and seem to have a harder time with metaphor, hyperbole, and sarcasm, but not 
all children misunderstand the same speech at the same time in the same way. What is 
more important to remember for our present investigation, however, is that the types of 
children’s misunderstandings we attribute to literal-mindedness are, by definition, 
misunderstandings. Diverging from the tacit understanding of minimally competent adult 
interpreters is a necessary prerequisite for our decision to describe a child’s 
(mis)understanding as a literal one, for when children take as literal a statement intended 
literally, this is seldom offered up as an example of their literal-mindedness. The 
examples that follow were all given as replies to the question, “[I]n what memorable 
ways have your kids answered you literally?” asked on an online forum:36 
1. I took my three-year-old son to see Santa. After he asked for a Buzz Lightyear 
toy, Santa offered him a sticker. My son said, “No thank you, just Buzz 
Lightyear.”37 
2. My son and his friend were tracing each other’s body outlines on the sidewalk 
with chalk. I marveled at their work, and then suggested they color in their 
faces. I watched my son coloring in his face—and then noticed that his friend 
had colored her actual face completely blue.38 
                                                
 36. “My 4-year old son was so proud to count to 5. When I asked him to count backward, he 
started walking backward while counting to 5, “way to easy,” he said. Reddit, in what memorable ways 
have your kids answered you literally?” submission to /r/AskReddit, 29 Nov 2012, 
https://www.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/140fhd/my_4year_old_son_was_so_proud_to_count_to_5_
when/. Quotes include minor edits to spelling, formatting, punctuation and capitalization for the purpose of 
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3. A doctor assessing my then six-year-old son asked him could he write the 
numbers one up to ten. He wrote the number one, drew an arrow upwards, and 
wrote the number ten above it.39 
4. My parents asked me to count higher. I climbed on the couch and put my 
hands as high as possible and just counted to ten again. I was higher up; 
technically I was correct.40 
5. When my daughter was a baby, I would read her the Shakespeare Treasury 
instead of baby books. When she was about three and a half, we stood behind 
a man in line at the supermarket. He was nervously looking back and nibbling 
on his fingernails. My daughter looks up in disgust and asks him, “Do you bite 
your thumb at me, Sir?”41 
6. Me: I have to pee! Dad: Can you hold it? Me: But... but won’t it drip through 
my fingers?42 
7. I was trying to get my girlfriend’s twenty-one-month-old daughter to eat her 
food. Me holding her spoon: “Aubrey's food.” Aubrey: “No no no no 
no.” Shaking her head back and forth. Me taking a bite to show that it is good. 
Aubrey looking very satisfied: “Drew-Drew’s food,” and it was settled and 
she would eat no more.43 
8. One afternoon after daycare, my mom asked my little brother if he behaved 
that day. He said, “Well, I was a little have but not much have.”44 
9. One year, for Christmas, my mom got my sister a diary, as she’d been pretty 
vocal about how all of her friends had one, and how much she wanted one. To 
my mom’s dismay, however, she seemed to never use it, and even asked my 
mom to keep it safe when she didn't need it. My mom, being a good parent, 
never opened it to read what she had written inside. One day, my sister got a 
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particularly nasty bout of food poisoning, and kept asking my mom for her 
diary at odd times throughout the sickness. Finally, my mom asked her how 
she decided when she should write in her diary. “When I have diarrhea, of 
course.” My sister thought that diaries were for logging bouts of diarrhea.45 
 
 What is common to most of these examples is that the children’s understandings 
diverge from the meaning that would be normal or obvious to nearly anyone but the 
particular child in question. Presumably, none of the other children waiting in line to sit 
on Santa’s lap in Example 1 above interpreted the free sticker as a Christmas present, the 
acceptance of which precludes the granting of one’s Christmas wish. The father’s son in 
Example 2 understood him correctly even if the son’s friend did not. The children in 
Examples 3 and 4 both misunderstood an adult’s instructions about counting because the 
instructions included conventional metaphors related to vertical positioning, but each 
child arrived at a very different solution to this linguistic puzzle. In Example 5, a child’s 
unique upbringing and mindset leads her to misinterpret a stranger’s nervous nail biting 
as an insult. It is unlikely that anyone else could have made the same mistake—neither a 
child who grew up with more typical bedtime stories by Dr. Seuss, nor an adult familiar 
with Shakespeare’s work, nor even a resident of Elizabethan London transported forward 
in time. We describe as literal all deviations from an adult speaker’s intended meaning, 
whether these departures are a result of sincere misunderstanding (Example 6) or a 
willful twisting of language to serve one’s personal agenda (Example 7). As far as sincere 
misunderstandings are concerned, we can imagine some of the interpretive mistakes 
(Examples 2 and 6) being repeated by some (but not all, and perhaps not even most) other 
children, but others (Examples 8 and 9) are highly idiosyncratic. When children interpret 
                                                






literally statements that minimally competent interpreters would also interpret literally, 
there is no reason to take notice of the child’s interpretation or describe it as literal. But 
when children interpret a colloquialism differently than intended (Example 6), invent a 
novel colloquialism rather than adopting the standard one (“The sign wrote…”), or 
assume a pseudo-etymology unsupported by usage history (Examples 8 and 9), these 
(mis)understandings we describe as literal. 
 As with children, many individuals who fall somewhere on the autism spectrum 
are able communicate successfully on a regular basis. When things go smoothly—when a 
person on the spectrum interprets an utterance just as any other minimally competent 
interlocutor would—this is never highlighted as an example of autistic literal-
mindedness. But as with children, whenever a person on the spectrum interprets an 
utterance in an unexpected way, these lapses in successful communication are used as 
evidence to justify our claims that they are literal-minded. Even before looking at specific 
examples, we can reason that this is the case. If we did not find humor in the ways autism 
influences a person’s way of seeing the world; if it did not cause behavioral and social 
challenges at school, work, and home; and if it did not lead to ways of thinking that tend 
to be different from one’s caretakers, family, peers, friends, and authority figures, then 
there would be no reason to take notice of the phenomenon. When we describe an autistic 
person’s (mis)understanding as literal, it is because it diverges from the tacit 
understanding of a minimally competent adult interlocutor. It may also diverge from the 
tacit understanding of a child who does not fall on the autism spectrum and even from 




divergences is often beyond our ability to anticipate, even when tasked with trying to 
predict how someone on the spectrum might see things.   
 There are three phenomena common among people on the spectrum that may 
seem to justify our description of such individuals as literal-minded: (1) a tendency to 
interpret rules and commands legalistically, (2) visual thinking, and (3) a rigid adherence 
to a “one word–one object” way of thinking. One might think that a teacher or caretaker 
who is aware of the first phenomenon could avoid mishaps with extremely careful word 
choice, but predicting which commands will result in confusion—and what form that 
confusion will take—proves exceedingly difficult. Consider the following story about 
Kevin, as presented by Mary Pittman: 
Kevin […] was following written instructions in a food technology lesson when 
he read, “Sprinkle flour on the worktop and roll the pastry.” Kevin proceeded to 
sprinkle flour on the worktop and then to put a knife along the edge of the 
worktop as if trying to damage it. When asked what he was doing he explained 
that he had to get the worktop up to roll his pastry.46  
 
 Who could have predicted Kevin’s unique response to what seems a fairly 
straightforward instruction? Other students did not read these instructions and briefly 
consider prying off the worktop with a knife before discounting the interpretation as 
needlessly destructive and therefore incorrect. Prying off the worktop is not a possible 
meaning that other interlocutors first comprehend and then rule out in this situation; it is 
an interpretation that would probably never occur to someone who is not on the autism 
spectrum and perhaps not to any individual except Kevin himself. Kevin’s 
misinterpretation here seems worthy of the descriptor literal precisely because of how 
                                                





radically it departs from the meaning that would be tacit to another interpreter in the 
context of a food technology lesson.  
 The second phenomenon that suggests a connection between autism and literal-
mindedness is visual thinking. Michael Barton provides us with a window into his own 
particular mental worldview with his book It’s Raining Cats and Dogs. This book grew 
out of his personal notes and drawings, which he made to help him memorize the 
conventional meanings of expressions that confused him. His illustration for the 
eponymous idiom, “it’s raining cats and dogs,” shows what the reader expect: cats and 
dogs falling from the sky.47 But Rachel Cohen-Rottenberg is adamant that this is not the 
image that pops into her own mind when she hears the phrase:  
When I asked my non-autistic husband what he saw in his mind when he heard 
this expression, he said, “Nothing. I just experience it as a metaphor for heavy 
rain.” In contrast, when I hear the expression “It’s raining cats and dogs,” I 
literally see the word “cats” and the word “dogs” falling down like rain. I also see 
the literal rain—in fact, the words are falling with the rain and splashing into 
puddles—but I don’t see visual images of cats and dogs.48 
 
Cohen-Rottenberg’s mental image of words splashing into puddles and Barton’s image of 
falling cats and dogs both result from the tendency of people on the spectrum to—from 
an outside perspective—over-visualize what they hear, but the visualizations themselves 
are strikingly different. This serves as an important reminder that while many people on 
the spectrum experience similar phenomena, these phenomena manifest in markedly 
different ways. Knowing that people on the spectrum think literally and visually is not 
enough to predict the specifics of how this will play out. Cohen-Rottenberg’s unique 
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image in particular would be hard for anyone else to anticipate, and, contrary to Barton’s 
experience, she reports that this delightful visual has never given her any trouble in 
interpreting the idiom.49  
 The third phenomenon used to justify our characterization of people on the autism 
spectrum as literal-minded is what Olga Bogdashina describes as “one word–one 
object.”50 Bogdashina cites the following example from Liane Holliday Willey: 
 I vividly remember my teacher announcing, ‘Children, find your mats and 
take your nap.’ I refused. Again, the teacher called my parents… 
 ‘Liane, why won’t you take your nap?’ my parents wondered of me… 
‘Because I don’t have a mat.’ 
 ‘You most certainly do have a mat. There it is in your cubby’, the teacher 
replied. 
 ‘I don’t have a mat.’ 
 ‘You see what I mean… She is an obstinate child.’ 
 ‘Why do you say you don’t have a mat?’ the folks asked, not giving up on 
me. 
 ‘That is not a mat. That is a rug,’ I honestly and accurately replied. 
 ‘So it is,’ said my father. ‘Will you take a nap on your rug?’ 
 ‘If she tells me to,’ I said matter-of-factly. 
 ‘Tell her to take a nap on her rug,’ my father said as my parents turned to 
take me home. I wasn’t trying to be difficult, I was trying to do the right thing. 
The trouble was, the teacher assumed I understood language like other children 
did. I did not.51 
 
This example once again illustrates how knowing that people on the autism spectrum 
think differently is not sufficient for understanding how someone on the spectrum will 
think. Although the parents in this story knew that autism, rather than insolence, was the 
root of the problem, they could not fathom why their daughter was behaving the way she 
was until she said, “That is not a mat. That is a rug.” What we think of as literal in this 
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example of explicitly literal interpretation, then, bears no resemblance to the tacitly literal 
meaning of the command, “Children, find your mats and take your nap,” which would be 
the simple, obvious, plain, or straightforward meaning to our idea of a minimally 
competent interlocutor.  
 Two themes are consistent in the various examples we have been examining in 
this section: (1) the more radically an interpretation differs from our estimation of the 
obvious, simple, or conventional meaning—the more outlandish, humorous, or off-the-
wall it seems to us—the more likely we are to describe it as literal, and (2) many of these 
so-called literal meanings are beyond our ability to predict, even if we were tasked with 
anticipating how a literal-minded individual might interpret the word diary or the 
instruction to “Sprinkle flour on the worktop and roll the pastry.” Despite what we 
suggest during our meta-discussions about language, we are strangely compelled to 
describe as literal precisely those interpretations that lie beyond the tendencies and even 
capabilities of typical, minimally competent interlocutors. Paul Grice’s cooperative 
principle gives us a theoretical framework for understanding why this counterintuitive 
phenomenon is so widespread. Our final example will demonstrate just how far back it 
extends in the history of the English language.  
John Purvey’s Prologue to the Wycliffite Bible 
 Early on in my research, I made the decision to go through the first uses of literal 
recorded in Early English Books Online (EEBO) one by one, tagging each with a 
subjective label of “expected” or “unexpected.” I had hypothesized that many of these 
early examples would seem as strange to me as Augustine’s claim that Christ “is literally 




consensus among early English writers. However, I soon discovered that the uses of 
literal I had labeled “expected” tended to simply insist on a distinction between literal 
and other kinds of meaning without providing much additional detail. For example, the 
earliest use of literal recorded in the OED comes from John Purvey’s prologue to the 
Wycliffite Old Testament, probably composed before 1397: “Holy scripture hath iv 
understandings; literal, allegorical, moral, and anagogical.”52 
 As long as the difference between literal and other kinds of meaning is left to 
one’s imagination and specific applications are avoided, everything seems to be in order. 
Only when an author ventures into the nitty-gritty of literal interpretation does the 
illusion of broad consensus begin to dissipate. To be sure, an author may still dabble in 
illustrative examples and maintain the illusion. For instance, the OED actually cites a 
second example of Purvey’s use of literal from the prologue that seems to illustrate the 
first: “To the literal understanding it [i.e. Jerusalem] signifieth an earthly city […] to 
allegory it signifieth holy church on earth […] to moral understanding it signifieth a 
Christian soul […] to anagogical it signifieth holy church reigning in bliss.”53 But this 
fourfold interpretation of a single word divorced from context is not where the rubber 
meets the road. How does literal interpretation play out when a specific thinker interprets 
a whole verse or a complicated passage or the interrelation between multiple passages? In 
its effort to selectively curate representative examples, the OED glosses over Purvey’s 
more complex uses of literal in the prologue, such as his overview of Scripture’s 
supposed “double” literal sense: 
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 The 3rd rule is of the spirit and the letter. This rule is commonly 
explained in this way: that the historical, or literal sense, and the mystical, 
or spiritual sense, are taken under the same letter. For this reason, the 
integrity of the story shall hold, and nevertheless it shall be referred to the 
spiritual understanding. This rule may be explained in another manner that 
it be related also to the literal sense, as other rules have been. About which 
thing it is to say that the same letter sometimes has a double literal sense. 
For instance, in the first book of Paralipomenon, the 17th chapter (1 Chr 
17:13),54 God says to Solomon, “I shall be to him a father, and he shall be 
to me a son.” And this to the letter is understood of Solomon, in as much as 
he was the son of God by grace in youth. Therefore Nathan the prophet 
called his name Amiable to the Lord in the 2nd book of Kings, the 12th 
chapter (2 Sam 12:25).55 Also the previously quoted passage, “I shall be to 
him a father,” etc. is brought in by Paul, in the first chapter of Hebrews 
(Heb 1:5), as said to the letter of Christ himself. And this is revealed that 
Paul brings in to prove: that Christ is more than angels. But such proof may 
not be made by spiritual sense, as Augustine says against Vincent [the] 
Donatist.56 Indeed, the previously quoted passage was fulfilled to the letter 
in Solomon. Nevertheless perfectly: for he was the son of God only by 
grace. But it was fulfilled more perfectly in Christ that was the son of God 
by kind.  
 But nevertheless each statement is utterly literal. Nevertheless the 
second statement, which is of Christ, is spiritual and proves in some 
manner, in as much as Solomon was the figure of Christ.57 
 
 In this section, Purvey is paraphrasing the third of seven rules set forth by a 6th-
century church father, Isidore of Seville.58 To reconcile the rule “of the spirit and the 
letter” with Augustine’s claim that convincing arguments can only be made from the 
literal sense, Purvey inserts another paraphrase of the 14th-century French theologian 
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Nicholas of Lyra’s concept of a “double” literal sense without comment or 
embellishment, as if this represents his own views on the matter. If one wishes to hang on 
to the belief that there existed a time in the history of English when the word literal 
remained pure, unadulterated, and unambiguous prior to corruption by the ignorant 
masses, it seems to me one must subscribe to Nicholas of Lyra’s particular reading of 2 
Sam 7:14 and Heb 1:5 and Purvey’s attempt to reconcile Isidore with Augustine: King 
Solomon and Jesus Christ are both utterly literal sons of God…but Christ even “more 
perfectly” so. If, however, this exposition is at odds with one’s understanding of what 
literal means, then one must conclude either that Purvey’s use is anomalous or that this 
word has been used strangely since its inception in English. I hope the various examples 
provided so far will be enough to convince the reader there are too many “anomalies” to 
reach the former conclusion.  
Conclusion 
 In the previous chapter, we established that literal meaning is typically 
conceptualized as that which minimally competent interlocutors understand tacitly. How 
surprising, then, to discover that the interpretations we explicitly describe as literal tend 
to be just the opposite—the sort that occur only to incompetent or maximally competent 
interlocutors. Whether we accept or reject the intensive use of l, we find that speakers use 
l only when they think it will guide the audience toward non-tacit interpretations. The 
absurdity of the superfluous use, along with Grice’s notion of the cooperative principle, 
helps us understand why l is rarely used by speakers to indicate tacit meaning, and sounds 
strange to us when it is. Furthermore, since puns, wordplay, and double entendres that 




do not balk when qualities normally considered anathema to literality are explicitly 
associated with l.  
 When we use l to describe the interpretations of others, rather than to guide 
audience interpretation of our own words, we find that the understanding of those we 
characterize as literal-minded is, by definition, misunderstanding, whether accidental (as 
in the case of children, people on the autism spectrum, and Amelia Bedelia) or intentional 
(as in the case of genies, or a child less than two years old who smiles and says “Drew-
Drew’s food!”). These misunderstandings are not interpretations that minimally 
competent interlocutors can predict, evaluate, and then transcend. Rather, they are the 
sort that would occur only to an interlocutor who is either incompetent or maximally 
competent.  
 Most of the examples in this chapter were drawn from everyday use in order to 
demonstrate that our collective propensity for describing as literal precisely those 
interpretations that deviate from the tacit understanding of minimally competent 
interlocutors is not limited to those who privilege the literal meaning of Scripture. 
However, we returned to another text that privileges the literal meaning of scripture for 





 In this thesis, I have been exploring the disconnect between our meta-discussions 
about language (which suggest that literal meaning coincides with the tacit understanding 
of minimally competent interlocutors) and the actual interpretations we end up describing 
as literal outside these meta-discussions (which tend to be precisely those that deviate 
from the tacit understanding of minimally competent interlocutors). This matters because 
literal meaning’s perceived coherence with what is tacit to minimally competent 
interlocutors is a significant reason why literal meaning is often privileged or disparaged. 
In Chapter 1, I developed a litmus test for determining if this disconnect between tacitly 
and explicitly literal interpretation undermines one’s reasons for privileging or 
disparaging a given interpretation and applied it to two texts that privilege the literal 
interpretation of Scripture.  
 I chose to focus on these texts because 24% of Americans polled in 2017 agree 
that the Bible is best interpreted literally. Those who do not fall into this category might 
unfairly assume that those who privilege the literal meaning of Scripture are particularly 
susceptible to the disconnect between tacitly and explicitly literal interpretation due to 
their theological bias. I hope the more generalized evidence presented in Chapter 2 will 
dispel this notion and reveal a more widespread, longstanding, possibly inescapable 
phenomenon. I do not believe the interlocutors who privilege literal meaning and appear 
guilty of doublespeak when subjected to my litmus test or other deconstructive readings 
are being intentionally duplicitous. Saussure has shown how different systems of 
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differentiation, though arbitrary in their organization, can still communicate meaning and 
appear internally coherent.  
 I have no doubt that many of those who continue to insist on privileging literal 
interpretation, if they did acknowledge the reality of the disconnect I am trying to draw 
attention to, would see themselves as exceptions to the rule. Additional applications of 
the litmus test to other texts and additional examples of our collective propensity for 
describing as literal precisely those meanings that deviate from the tacit understanding of 
minimally competent interlocutors could be helpful in this regard.  
 The present investigation has only identified a phenomenon and analyzed a few 
representative examples found “in the wild.” Although it was well beyond the purview of 
this project, I would be excited to see what else could be learned in a controlled 
laboratory setting. How, for example, might people of different religious affiliations and 
varying levels of familiarity with a given passage of Scripture answer a question about its 
literal meaning? And how might the question itself, method of response, and testing 
environment influence the range of answers? Controlling for other factors, would 
participants answer the question “What is the literal meaning of the following passage?” 
differently from “Take the following passage literally”? How might answers differ 
among respondents who are asked to speak their responses versus writing them down 
versus typing them on a computer versus drawing a picture? And to what extent could 
researchers induce certain responses by, for example, having some participants submit 
descriptions of a “literal keyboard” from a computer while others use pen and paper 
while sitting at a piano bench under the pretense that the university’s practice rooms were 
a quiet and convenient place to conduct the study? 
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 Comparisons between similar literal interpretations found in the wild fall short of 
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